CDATA Encoder / Decoder
Wrap text in <![CDATA[ ]]> — handling an embedded ]]> safely — or unwrap CDATA back to plain text.
What is CDATA Encoder?
A CDATA helper for both directions. Encoding puts raw text inside a CDATA section so it can contain `<` and `&` unescaped; decoding turns CDATA back into plain text, which you then have to escape if it is going inside an element.
How it works
Encoding wraps the value, and if the text itself contains the `]]>` terminator the section is split at each occurrence so the result stays a single, valid text node — a detail that breaks hand-written CDATA. Decoding finds every section, reports the count and any unterminated one, and returns the contents with the markers removed.
- Paste the document. Drop in XML, a schema, a feed or an XPath expression. Everything is parsed in the page: no upload, no server round trip, and the tools keep working with the network switched off.
- Set the options that match your document. Indent unit, whether to keep comments, which dialect, which output method. The defaults are the safe ones — nothing that changes meaning is enabled for you.
- Read the result, then copy or download it. Results appear as you type, copy straight to the clipboard, and download with a sensible filename (.xml, .xsd, .csv). Reset returns every field to its default.
Examples
A minified document from an API response
Paste one line of XML and the Formatter indents it, wraps long start tags one attribute per line and normalises empty elements — without touching text inside mixed content.
An XPath that works in Chrome and not in your servlet
The XPath Tester evaluates against a real tree and reports the axis or function it cannot support, instead of returning zero nodes and letting you guess why.
A document that will not parse
The Validator gives line and column for every mismatched tag, stray ampersand and duplicate attribute, with the reason in words: which open element was expected, which was found.
A schema that only half matches your data
The XSD Validator marks each violation with the path of the offending node, and the Schema Generator goes the other way — inferring a starting-point XSD from real documents.
Common mistakes
Assuming a pretty-printer cannot change meaning
Whitespace between elements is often insignificant, but inside mixed content it is not: `<p>Hello <b>world</b></p>` must stay on one line. Formatting here re-indents element-only content and leaves mixed content alone.
Treating a validation pass as proof of interoperability
The DTD and XSD validators implement honest subsets. A document reported valid here can still be rejected by a full validator that understands identity constraints, substitution groups or XSD 1.1 assertions — each page lists what it does not cover.
Reading the whole document because the parser did
A DOCTYPE is not inert. If your parser resolves external entities, pasting an untrusted document is enough to read a file or call an internal URL. The XXE Risk Checker shows what a document asks for; the fix is in the parser configuration.
Forgetting that attributes and elements are not interchangeable
`<id>1</id>` and `id="1"` mean different things to every schema and every XPath. When converting to CSV or YAML the distinction is preserved (`@id`), because flattening it away is the change that costs an afternoon later.
Frequently asked questions
When should I use CDATA instead of escaping?
When the payload is large and mostly markup: an RSS item containing HTML, or a query with many comparison operators. Escaping works everywhere and composes with everything — CDATA is unreadable inside an attribute, and it is what people reach for when the value is really a document of its own.
Why does my text contain a stray `]]>`?
Because that sequence terminates a CDATA section wherever it appears, so it cannot occur inside one. The encoder splits the section around it and reopens it, which is the standard workaround; pasting the text into a section by hand is what produces the stray terminator.
Does CDATA protect text from parsing entirely?
No. It suppresses markup recognition inside the section, but entity references are still resolved and the value still has to obey XML's character rules. It is a convenience for readability, not a security boundary.